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The World Turned Upside Down  
 
   Peter Field  
 
The tale is as old as the American republic. On October 19, 1781, Lord Charles 
Cornwallis, Knight Companion of The Most Noble Order of the Garter, surrendered to 
George Washington and the American Continental Army. Defeated yet defiant, 
Cornwallis ordered the Red Coat band to accompany the proceedings with the tune 
“The World Turned Upside Down.” The choice was not accidental. It alluded the 
shocking events leading up to His Majesty’s troops’ ignominious capitulation at the 
hands of upstart colonists, which seemed straight out of Macbeth where nature itself 
has gone awry. King George III, like his routed general, proved so dazed and 
confused by defeat at the hands of the Americans that for years after the Treaty of 
Paris he refused to allow his cabinet to speak the words: “the United States of 
America.” Had the world turned upside down? 
Two hundred and thirty-five years later, on 20 January 2017, Donald J. Trump 
became the duly elected American president, 45th in a direct line from General 
Washington. Brilliant and talented individuals have occupied the presidential chair, 
among them John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, two Roosevelts, 
John Kennedy and Barack Obama. Trump’s elevation to that exalted office sent 
shock waves through American and world political institutions. Virtually everyone 
wondered how this man, of all Americans seemingly so utterly unfit for office, could 
become president of the United States. Could the world be so upside down that 
Trump would be the chief executive of the self-same nation secured at Yorktown by 
Washington’s Army? The very implausibility of his triumph initiated a groundswell of 
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opposition, “the resistance,” dedicated to reversing the Democrats’ defeat and 
dispatching the interloper.  One comedian’s staged decapitation of a presidential 
look-alike went viral,1 while a multitude of women took to the streets in protest 
donning self-styled pussy hats.2 Given the choice between accepting the electorate’s 
slim preference on the day that resulted in a lopsided electoral majority, on the one 
hand, or seeking to delegitimize the entire election, on the other, the members of the 
resistance vehemently chose the latter option. The real risk to American trust of their 
political institutions seemed at the time a small price to pay to remove the miscreant. 
Trump could not be the legitimately, constitutionally elected president. Some 
organization or foreign power had interfered and the resistance would provide the 
impetus to root out the culprits. If the election of 2016 did prove constitutional and 
fairly staged, then the Republican triumph only demonstrated how far the republic 
had degenerated, how it was already in crisis. For the resistance inside of the United 
States and for many others and beyond its borders the world had indeed turned 
upside down.  
 
*   *   * 
Who is Donald J. Trump and how did Americans elect him? What do we know 
about him and the MAGA moment? The answers are not so easy to discern. He is 
the first American president to have neither served in the military nor held public 
office before becoming chief executive. A twice-divorced property developer and 
television celebrity whose tax returns remain under embargo, the public continues to 
be as ignorant of Trump’s personal fortune as his genuine political convictions. His 
media persona offers intriguing clues but little beyond intimations of the real Trump 
behind the gilded, spray-tanned veneer. Trump has several books to his name, so 
one might be tempted to read The Art of the Deal or Think Big and Kick Ass to 
discover clues to his identity, if he actually wrote a word of them.3 How about a diary 
or journal? Not a shred of evidence suggests that such objects exist. Trump seems 
the least self-reflective political figure of our times. How do we get behind the 
orange-coifed façade?  
Presidents enjoy certain prerogatives, some of which intimate aspects of their 
character. One such privilege relates to the placement of art and iconography in the 
White House. President Obama famously banished Sir Jacob Epstein’s bust of 
Winston Churchill from the East Room to make way for one of Martin Luther King, Jr.4 
Predictably, many presidents choose likenesses of former famous residents to grace 
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White House walls. Especially popular have been the Founders such as Washington 
or Jefferson. Abraham Lincoln was Obama’s choice. Which leads us to Trump. 
Conspicuously visible behind the president during his briefings is Thomas Sully’s 
striking portrait (1845) of Andrew Jackson5. That Trump would find in himself critical 
aspects of the seventh president should come as no surprise. By all measures an 
outsider, Jackson seemed to be an enemy of ‘establishment’ Washington and always 
in opposition. Jackson’s personality more than his policies became the centerpiece 
of the political discourse of the 1830s. Old Hickory strikes this American historian as 
about as apt a presidential precedent as one might imagine in the entire American 
political firmament. How fittingly Sully’s portrait hangs behind Trump and how 
revelatory of the president’s self-image. Hardly the Age of Trump, the moment in 
which we find ourselves seems one of disruption whose themes seem to converge 
on the orange-haired outsider who snookered the 2016 election from the political 
class. Separated by two centuries, Trump and Jackson the disruptors mirror each 
other. 
The current occupant of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue offers little evidence that 
he has a grasp of American history. It seems highly unlikely that he perceives the 
remarkable parallels between himself and his predecessor of nearly two centuries as 
would a scholar or student of history. Nowhere has Trump revealed any particular 
knowledge, much less deep understanding, of Andrew Jackson and how his career 
might parallel his own. Nevertheless, Trump has certain affinities with Jackson and 
seems to have stumbled upon a model of leadership from the nineteenth century 
that speaks to his own time and political moment. When asked about Jackson, a 
White House spokesperson noted that Trump admired his predecessor’s “ability to 
never give up,” that he was “an amazing figure in American history — very unique so 
many ways.” Sully’s East Room portrait depicts a president who, like Trump himself, 
was largely unschooled; his critics lampooned him for his apparent ignorance. 
Jackson famously boasted that his education was solely of the ‘school of hard 
knocks’ variety. “They’re both seen as uncompromising fighters,” notes National 
Public Radio journalist Steve Inskeep, who has written a book on Jackson. Despite 
obvious differences, both men “took the side of the people they were loyal to [and] … 
fought for those people and for themselves as well and didn’t care who else got 
hurt.”6 As unlikely as it may seem, Trump’s intuition of the striking similarities across 
almost two centuries of American history has resulted in Thomas Sully’s Jackson 
unflinchingly surveying this administration not unlike F. Scott Fitzgerald’s fictitious 
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ophthalmologist, Dr Eccles, who imperiously observed Daisy, Tom and Nick in The 
Great Gatsby. What the seventh president’s judgment of his twenty-first century 
successor is any one’s guess. 
The provenance of the Sully portrait hanging in the East Room seems clear 
enough. Steven Bannon hatched the idea. The erstwhile Trump campaign advisor 
and Oval Office consultant had read Walter Prescott Meade’s biography of the Hero 
of New Orleans7. After quickly warming to the relationship between Trump and 
Jackson, Bannon managed to convince the new president of the historical 
correlation and its symbolic utility. As if to cement the connection, Trump only weeks 
into his presidency made a well-staged visit to the Hermitage, Old Hickory’s Nashville 
plantation.8 However, no sooner did the president return from Tennessee than he 
banished Bannon and his unsavoury right-wing connections from the White House 
for good. Yet the Sully portrait remained. It reminds friend and foe alike that the 
Jackson-Trump connection bears deeper scrutiny that from one populist to another, 
there exists a vital ideological link with roots deep in the American political tradition. 
Andrew Jackson, American president from 1829-1837, serves as an eminently 
suitable window into the whacky world of Donald J. Trump.  
 
*   *   * 
Jackson and Trump are far from identical. Unlike Trump, the seventh president 
boasted a pedigree from our perspective today eminently suitable for the nation’s 
highest office. Before winning the election of 1828, Jackson had run for president in 
1824, a four-way race in which he had garnered the most popular and electoral 
votes, but fell short of an electoral majority. Denied the office in the House of 
Representatives in favour of John Quincy Adams, Jackson was nevertheless 
destined to triumph four years later. Prior to running for national office in 1824, he 
had represented his state of Tennessee in both houses of Congress, culminating in 
one of the state’s first appointments to the Senate at the turn of the nineteenth 
century. A lawyer by profession, Jackson served on the High Court of the Volunteer 
State after his retirement from the Senate. Compared to Trump’s career trajectory, his 
proved to be that of the consummate republican politician. 
Jackson was also a military man. In fact, his fame stemmed almost entirely 
from his martial exploits, none more so than his miraculous triumph over the British 
at the Battle of New Orleans. A leader of the Tennessee militia, Jackson had 
ascended to the rank of major general in the United States Army by the conclusion of 
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the War of 1812. His astonishing 1815 victory at New Orleans with a miniscule 
fighting force of soldiers, militiamen and slaves became the stuff of legend; it made 
him the most popular military figure since Washington. He was also controversial. 
Jackson commanded an 1817 invasion of Spanish Florida, which many Americans 
hailed as a triumph of the will and a vocal few furiously condemned as a willful 
adventure. The summary trial and hanging of two British nationals in Florida 
cemented Jackson’s bifurcated reputation, a decisive leader on the one hand and as 
a would-be despot with little or no regard for the rule of law on the other. 
Comparisons across centuries can be fraught and the direct affinities between 
the two presidents at best sheds only dim reflected light on each. More illuminating 
is an exploration of semiotics, of what each represented as popular political figures 
in their respective epochs. As the Princeton scholar John William Ward noted about 
Old Hickory in his Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age, Jackson the individual, as 
interesting has his biography might be, proves less meaningful today than Jackson 
the symbol.9 The multitudes of Americans who respectively elevated Jackson and 
Trump to the Oval Office projected a particular and powerful set of images onto their 
candidates, images that speak more to the times than to the men. These symbolic 
qualities suggest the genuine meaning of the men in their times. Not the man but the 
symbol serves to explain the political culture of the times.  
Certain similarities are striking. The complex, even contradictory nature of their 
personae comes first to mind.10 Both Jackson and Trump presented themselves as 
interlopers and disruptors, despite the former being a wealthy plantation owner and 
the latter being, or at least projecting the image of being, one of the wealthiest 
individuals in a nation of over 300 million. It is paradoxical yet oddly American that 
the Hero of New Orleans and the host of a top-rated television show, both as 
recognizable as any of their political contemporaries, could appeal to multitudes of 
Americans as outsiders, as somehow underdogs with the administrative state and 
educated elite arrayed against them. Understanding why Trump sullies building 
facades across America with his name is beyond the scope of this essay; that people 
by the millions, otherwise unwelcome into the lobbies of Trump Towers or Mar-a-
Lago, view their eponymous developer-publicist-promoter as representative of their 
interests and sympathetic to their sense of powerlessness and desperation begs for 
explanation. So apparently unrepresentative, Trump is yet their man. 
The explanation for the Make America Great Again phenomenon emerges 
from deep in the American past, at least as far back as the Age of Jackson. Trump’s 
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base seems Jacksonian proportionally to the peculiarly American strand of populism 
still extant in the American character, an element that defines itself largely in 
opposition. Feeling increasingly enfeebled in a world of great inequality, today’s 
‘Jacksonians,’ who comprise the MAGA movement, clearly identify with a charismatic 
disruptor.11 In this sense, both Jackson and Trump positioned themselves, or became 
available, to play the vanquisher of a smug, self-serving, entrenched elite. Denied the 
presidency in 1824 in a ‘corrupt bargain’ that to his supporters seemed no less 
corrupt because it was technically constitutional, Jackson secured for himself the 
role of the outsider destined to restore the people’s government from those using the 
state for their own corrupt ends. If voters measured their man by his enemies, then 
Jackson reigned supreme as underdog and outsider, fighting back against the 
subversion of the popular will in the election of 1824 as well as the influence and 
inertia of the old guard massed against him.12  His opponents haughtily proclaimed 
Old Hickory’s unfitness for office, that he was an orphan, lacked a pedigree, had not 
attended Harvard or Princeton, that he was from the West, that he was a duelist. The 
more his Whig opponents embellished the symbolic role of disrupter into which 
Jackson seamlessly stepped, the greater his popularity in the country at large. The 
democracy did not seek to elevate Jackson to the presidency despite his lack of elite 
credentials. They elected him because of it.  
The same for Trump in 2016. As with Old Hickory, The Donald seems a most 
unlikely underdog or outsider. He might never have won the presidency if his 
opponents had possessed the native wit or political instincts to understand his 
popular appeal. Both Republican and Democratic establishments sought in 2016 
and seek to this day to expose Trump’s complete lack of bona fides, as if the MAGA 
constituency concurs that an Ivy League education is a prerequisite to higher office. 
The tried and true criteria of ‘Ivy League or out of this league’ has never played in 
Peoria or anywhere else in Middle America. Taking his cue from George Bush who 
spoke as if he never gone to Yale, candidate Trump never mentioned his years at the 
prestigious Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. The more frequently 
the Bushes, Clintons and their Yale-pedigreed allies scolded Trump in 2016 for his 
lack of education, his imbecilic syntax and his Queens English (the outer New York 
City borough, not the English monarchy), the more they played into his disruptor 
persona. Capitalizing on his opponents’ smug elitism, Donald Trump, despite his 
preparatory school education and a multi-million-dollar inheritance, emerged as the 
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Andrew Jackson of our times. Trump fashioned himself in 2016 as the underdog 
outsider candidate. He still does. 
The Jackson-Trump brand of insurgent politics features a particularly 
American characteristic often labelled populism. While right-wing populists have 
emerged in recent decades around the world from Eastern Europe to South America, 
the populist movement as a phenomenon boasts roots that lie deep in the United 
States and its political culture. Crucial aspects of Jacksonianism that gave the era its 
name signalled the beginning of a novel political culture of populist insurgency. The 
insurgent-as-populist speaks to, or embodies, a specific challenge to established 
authority, a challenge featuring a set of grievances advanced in the name of the 
common people. Attacking established institutions is important, even essential, but 
hardly the critical feature of American populist movements. Rather, to be populist the 
insurgency must involve a call for ‘return,’ for the embrace of a lost or diminished 
ideal. In this sense, only the American tradition genuinely embraces populism as 
home grown, for in the United States alone has government “of the people, by the 
people and for the people” taken the form of scripture. The populist challenge to 
authority demands a return to rule of the people, which the United States claims to 
constitute a reversion to the ideals of its founding. We associate these ringing 
nostrums with Lincoln at Gettysburg in 1863 in the midst of a great Civil War but in 
fact they recall the founding principles of a nation “so conceived and dedicated” four 
score and seven years earlier. Lord Cornwallis called it right in 1781: the American 
Revolutionaries had turn the world upside down. The Jacksonians in the 1830s 
presaged the MAGA purveyors of our time. Both disdain revolution, instead 
demanding restoration. The second “A” in MAGA carries immense weight. It 
references a nostalgic desire to restore a preferred past rather than the overthrow of 
political culture. As disenchanted as Trump supporters seem, they do not seek 
destruction; they demand democratic renewal instead. One American revolution is 
sufficient. 
Claiming to be the American people’s tribune, in either the 1820s or the 2020s, 
captures an essential problematic: the tribune cannot lose. The American populist 
narrative demands victory. It is logically impossible for “the people” to defeat 
populism. A populism of the minority cannot exist. Fortunately for Jacksonians, their 
candidate was hugely popular, winning the popular vote in 1824 and trouncing his 
opponent in both popular and Electoral College voting in the two subsequent 
elections. Upon his retirement in 1837, Old Hickory’s coattails even enabled Martin 
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van Buren, his less-than-populist successor, to retain Democratic control of the White 
House. In the nineteenth century, victory validated and vindicated the populist hero. 
The same, one presumes, can be said about the MAGA movement and its candidate 
in 2016. No fool, candidate Trump understood the value of demonstrating his 
popularity. His populist mandate demanded that he make an issue of the ‘huge’ 
adulating crowds at his rallies. Time and again, Trump dared the media to pan wide, 
to show the size and scope of his popular appeal. The tribune of the people requires 
a great, even overwhelming turnout. Crucially, Trump and his apologists had to 
explain – or explain away – his defeat in the popular vote in populist terms, how 
California and New York were outliers, whose effete populations were somehow 
brainwashed or un-American. Far from discounting his populist status, the extreme, 
uniform opposition of the coastal elites proved beyond a doubt the providential 
aspect of Trump’s electoral triumph of 6 November 2016. The same line of reasoning 
explains the tempest in the teapot over the inaugural attendance six weeks later.  
Populist triumphs are providential. Providence, broadly understood, plays a 
critical role in the populist appeal. In Symbol for an Age Ward observed how 
Jacksonians’ symbolic embrace of their hero coalesced around three 
characterological tropes: nature, will and providence. All three in their own way 
translate from the Age of Jackson to the present day. The last trope – providence –
particularly resonates with and depends upon victory. It is the reason that the crowds 
at the inaugural were the biggest ever. Trump feels obliged to deny losses or 
rationalize them away. There can be no losses in a genuine democratic environment, 
no popular-vote setbacks, and no mid-term defeats. It is just not possible to back any 
losers and ‘the people’ cannot be ‘wrong;’ they can be over enthusiastic or impatient, 
but not wrong, because then democracy would be wrong. The Alabama special 
election to fill Jeff Sessions’ Senate seat is a case in point. The Republican defeat 
required a post-mortem that completely and absolutely exculpated MAGA. “Roy 
Moore was never a true Trumpian populist,” the White House insisted; “he was a 
hopeless candidate whose thin margin of defeat in fact proved a Trump victory.” 
Losing the House of Representatives in the mid-term elections required similar 
apologetics. The Administration explained the result in terms of influence and 
spillover from the bogus Mueller probe and deep state sabotage. In historic terms, 
Republicans suffered a smaller loss of seats than the average mid-term election and 
therefore really experienced a MAGA victory. Unlike other insurgencies, to be populist 
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is by definition to be providential. Populists must win or they are not genuinely 
tribunes of the people.  
Today’s political Progressives and their media allies largely concur, if only 
obliquely and inversely. At times, they appear resigned to accepting numerical 
defeat, especially in the Midwest, the Plains, the South and the non-coastal West. 
Progressives no longer identify losses in the flyover states as some temporary 
setback but as something more profound, something that confirms their deeper, 
often unarticulated doubts about democracy (as opposed to their preferred 
meritocratic oligarchy). The fact that the majority of non-coastal voters chose Trump 
on that fateful Tuesday in November signals to Progressives that American 
democracy itself is in a state of existential crisis. Progressives argued after the 
election that the nativist Trump voters proved themselves either hopelessly ill-
informed or hopelessly ignorant of their own basic self-interest. The states that went 
Republican, they hastened to point out, depend more on the very government 
largesse they symbolically disdain than those in which the majority voted 
Democratic. Confronted with a choice between revising a Progressive message that 
played so poorly in the last election or instead moving farther to the left, the 2020 
Democratic primaries suggest that the Progressive leadership, despite shunting 
aside Bernie Sanders in favour of the more ‘electable’ Joe Biden, has decidedly 
chosen the latter option.  It disdains the type of triangulation made famous by Bill 
Clinton in the 1990s, notwithstanding its prospects for reclaiming the majority of the 
electorate from Iowa to Pennsylvania and in states like Arizona, Tennessee and 
Florida. It seems unlikely that even a Trump re-election in 2020 would induce 
Progressives to reverse course. Instead, they likely will continue seek salvation in 
some combination of constitutional overhaul and/or demographic reconstruction of 
the nation through wholesale immigration.  So much for the American experiment in 
self-government.  
The Make America Great Again movement manifests another deep 
connection to a longstanding strain of American populism—that of latent animus. 
Non-revolutionary does not suggest a lack of hostility. Profound anger fuelled 
MAGA’s embrace of a vanquisher-hero like Trump in 2016. They still seek retribution. 
Focused on eviscerating the enemy, Trump’s supporters worried little, if at all, 
precisely who or what would follow on from victory. Destruction before construction. 
Herein lies the profoundly anti-intellectual aspect of populism famously alluded to by 
historian Richard Hofstadter.13 University-educated elites build; institution building and 
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administrative growth are their calling card. The possibility looms that MAGA voters 
possess an elemental distrust of any and all structures, as all of them, whether 
institutional or ideological, tend to be specialized, hierarchical and based on precise 
knowledge claims. Hierarchies discriminate on the basis of education and expertise; 
they are likely to exclude anyone wearing a MAGA cap. Disdainful of elite-enabled 
and complex constructions, populists harbor a wanton element of destructiveness 
and anti-institutionalism that makes effective governance extremely difficult. Their 
cries of “drain the swamp” suggest that MAGA populists content themselves merely 
with replacing the old regime. Draining the swamp echoes the very non-American 
Louis Antoine de Saint-Just’s observation from the French Revolution: “On s’engage 
et puis, on voit,” which might roughly be translated in Trumpian terms as “Scramble 
the pieces, dismantle the administrative state and then we’ll see.”  
Direct comparisons of the today’s administrative elites with the monopolists of 
the Age of Jackson is a fool’s errand. Yet, in the ideological fabrications of their 
antagonists, comparative analysis reveals substantial commonalities across two 
centuries. Populists swear that the administration of Adams then and Obama 
recently, as well as those of Madison and Monroe and Clinton, preyed on the vast 
majority of citizens for whom Trump and Jackson speak. These administrators fall 
into general categories. Firstly, there are the entrenched political elites of both the 
right and left, who cross long-standing party and ideological lines. Neither Trump nor 
Jackson demonstrated particular allegiance or personal ties to political parties. 
Trump changed his party affiliation five times before 2016. He remains as president a 
most unconventional Republican, embracing tariffs, demonstrating an utter aversion 
to adventurism in foreign policy and dubious of the alliance with Europe. In Jackson’s 
case, he proved as much the product of a political moment of party disintegration, 
when Federalist and Republican alike were in eclipse, as the creator of a novel party. 
Jackson’s allies largely constructed a new party out of the ruins of the old. 
Nonetheless, Jackson’s party transcended an old regime of elite Founders by means 
of an appeal explicitly untethered from old disputes between Massachusetts and 
Virginia or North and South. Although himself a Southern slaveholder, Jackson 
sought less to be the heir of Jefferson than the child of the new West and its frontier 
population. While in 1824 Jackson outpolled the highly educated son of the second 
president, his defeat of Adams was as much a victory over Jefferson’s William and 
Mary and Madison’s Princeton as it was Adams’ Harvard.  From a geographical 
perspective, Jackson was the successor of Jefferson; from a generational and 
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populist perspective, he sought not to inherit but disrupt the old order. Raised by 
women, a sensitive reader and devotee of the violin, the highly learned Jefferson was 
the epitome of respectability. Self-educated and self-made, Jackson the duellist was 
the political neophyte capable of building a party around the reputation of Old 
Hickory, martial heroism and being a force of nature.  
By any measure, Trump appears much less a force of nature than Jackson. 
Bearing no nickname like Old Hickory or any sobriquet beyond “The Donald,” 
Trump’s direct association with the natural seems non-existent. On the other hand, 
consider the depiction of Gotham in the recent blockbuster film The Joker, in which 
the city has morphed into an urban, concrete jungle on the brink of reversion to 
survival of the fittest. The consummate New Yorker, the dapper Donald is a creature 
of Gotham, who works out of a penthouse overlooking the Manhattan skyline. The 
closest thing to a natural aspect in Trump’s image would date back to the 1980s and 
his refurbishing of Central Park’s Wollman Rink and its proximity to the Zoo. A better 
analogy might be with Trump’s symbolic embrace of the laws of nature, particularly 
those of the free market and laissez-faire capitalism. Trump built his business empire 
where the rules are weakest or where he could skirt rules and regulations. Trump 
would have us believe that he dominates where natural competition reigns supreme. 
New York City, that urban jungle where the strong predate on the weak, brings out 
the best in Trump. Nowhere else but the cutthroat world of New York real estate and 
high-rise, high-risk construction projects could have provided a better proving 
ground for Trump’s rise. Reminiscent in some deep-rooted aspect of Old Hickory in 
the nineteenth century, Trump triumphs two centuries later in a state of nature 
populated by predatory politicians and mafia bosses; Trump equally casts aside 
corrupt Democratic unions and Republican old-money bankers. Seemingly without a 
college education or friends from Porcellian or Skull and Bones, he beats them all at 
their own game. Trump casts himself as the natural alpha-male. His buildings bear 
his name like so many pelts on Andrew Jackson’s pony. 
Populists demonstrate a paradoxical attitude toward money. Careful not to 
disparage individual initiative, making money or generating personal fortunes, they 
never the less champion the self-made and individual success predicated on 
personal initiative. Like the MAGA movement of today, Jacksonianism predicated 
itself on opposition to an entrenched class of wealth, particularly the bankers of 
Chestnut and Wall streets. Not free enterprise per se but inherited Eastern wealth 
provoked the wrath of hard-working Jacksonians. Their enemy was comprised of 
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those already possessing the power that money and connections bring and who 
exploited their station to impede the rise of others. By maintaining their grip on the 
reins of power, the privileged inhibited the progress of American democracy and 
constrained opportunity for the disadvantaged. The moneyed elite, Jacksonians 
insisted, eschewed healthy competition in favor of monopoly and government-
backing alliances that shielded the interests of a few at the expense of the greater 
good.  
President Jackson focused his animus on Nicholas Biddle and the Bank of the 
United States over which Biddle presided. While few Jacksonians necessarily knew 
Biddle or what he stood for, they well recalled the Panic of 1819 and the frequent and 
seemingly artificial contractions in money that squeezed debtors and foreclosed on 
farmers’ mortgages. The Bank of the United States became “the monster bank” and 
Biddle its malevolent mastermind. Biddle’s bank became the symbol of oligarchy 
and Jackson the tribune of the people. The president’s 1832 veto of the Bank 
recharter bill became the rallying cry of the election of 1832 and ultimately the 
signature legislation of the Age of Jackson. 
The Panic of 1819 and the rise of Jacksonianism suggests an analogy to the 
Global Financial Crisis of a decade ago and the rise of Trump. Legal channels 
unavailing, Trump supporters sought political retribution for the bankers and their 
elected enablers they held responsible for the economic displacement caused by 
their speculative excess. Trump no more ran on a platform advocating prosecution 
of the Wall Street and Washington culprits who brought on the crisis than Jackson 
did on the sources of the 1819 Panic. Not interested in explaining the disaster, 
Trump, like Jackson and the Panic before him, galvanized the deep-rooted if 
nebulous sense in the country that the GFC and globalization had cheated middle-
class Americans of their hard-earned treasure. The purported industrial policy of the 
previous administrations, both Republican and Democratic, had ignored the working 
class, instead advancing the interests of the few, of the top twenty percent whose 
jobs could not be outsourced, whose incomes did not depend on interest in savings 
accounts and who were not leveraged by mortgages, soaring healthcare costs and 
astronomical educational debts.  
Trump’s incessant bashing of “China, China, China” stood in for a general 
critique of globalization and the Beltway’s sell-out of the American heartland. Trump 
dispatched eleven venerable Republicans in the primaries and one “best qualified in 
years” Democrat in the general election by brilliantly exploiting many Americans’ 
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conviction that when the rich make mistakes they get special treatment. The rich and 
powerful always profit, whether it is Hillary Clinton in 1978 turning a $1,000 personal 
bet in Arkansas into a $100,000 windfall or some elite mistaking leverage for genius 
and recklessly betting and losing the entire market capitalization of an investment 
bank. The individuals responsible for disaster, in some perversion of natural justice, 
become themselves too big to fail. Government of the elite by the elite and for the 
elite in 2008 came to the rescue as it always does (the populist anger fueled Bernie 
Sanders on the left with his harsh accusations of “socialism for the rich and 
capitalism for the poor”). It bailed out privileged bankers’ cousins, who in the pursuit 
of profit had broken or at least bent the law. Americans who lost homes (or lost jobs 
because someone else defaulted on their home mortgage), felt most scandalized by 
the fact that not a single Wall Street wizard was convicted; not one did a day in jail. 
The failure to punish the guilty made manifest the corruption of the system. The 
MAGA campaign chant of “lock her up, lock her up,” expressed far more than anger 
at Hillary Clinton and her private email server. It represented a powerful, emotion-
laden cry for economic justice. Someone should have been locked up.  
Americans’ relationship with wealth is complex. Remarkably and significantly, 
as Trump knows instinctively, the self-made millionaire best speaks for the 
economically disadvantaged and disengaged. No poor or indigent person cannot 
lead the revolt. Her poverty simultaneously invites ridicule and the overthrow of 
capitalism. Led by the poor, revolt risks becoming something very different and 
dangerous. It portends revolution. Of course, any representative of the class of rich 
blue bloods cannot lead because he personifies the problem; he is the enemy. Very 
few candidates associated with either abject poverty or inherited wealth can issue 
the call for the restoration of capitalism by the overthrow of the entrenched elite. Only 
successful self-made celebrity can do so. Trump the populist in 2016 claimed exactly 
that mantle. 
Trump echoes Jackson in another important way. His overwhelming disdain 
for intellectuals, bureaucrats and opinion makers, whether genuine or staged, 
characterized the essence of his ascendency in both the Republican primaries and 
the general election. Trump’s opponents proved painfully slow to realize how 
counterproductive their protestations and exclamations about his lack of training or 
basic suitability for office. His apparent lack of education and inexperience defined 
his campaign. Both his alternative qualifications as well as his background in 
professional wrestling and reality television undergirded the crusade to Make 
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America Great Again. As a referendum on the regime of experts and intellectuals, the 
2016 election demanded unconventional leadership explicitly based on the simplest 
and most straightforward measures of success that amounted almost to banality. 
The essence of both wrestling and reality TV lies in its transparency; what you see is 
what you get. For American audiences and voters tired of blatantly obvious 
manipulation, the Trump medium was the message: “Even if it’s not real, at least it’s 
authentic.”  
The drive for authenticity explains the ubiquitous blue suit and overlong red tie. 
How in the world could a ridiculous tie and dark suit be the raiment of the MAGA 
candidate when so few Trump supporters owned more than blue jeans and only 
dressed formally at the family weddings or funerals, if ever? We willfully 
misunderstand MAGA and Trump if we insist on voters’ lemming-like identification 
with their candidate. Trump never pretended to be like the people. Their names do 
not grace the sides of buildings; they do not live in marble-floored penthouse 
apartments with private security details. Far from it. The meaning and political value 
of formal attire emerges only by means of contrast. As with “The Apprentice,” the 
comparative value is everything. A public manipulated by Hollywood directors, 
producers, editors and writers hungered for reality television. An analogous revulsion 
stirs the public’s sense of manipulation by the handlers and managers of politicians, 
who scripted every move and message of their candidates. Jeb Bush in overalls or 
Marco Rubio in an outsized cowboy hat at the Iowa State Fair was as obviously 
scripted as Michael Dukakis parading around in an Abrams tank a generation ago. It 
was all so obviously contrived as to beg Trump to burlesque it. Trump gleefully 
mocked his opponents, while his savage humor signified how awkward, out-of-
character and ridiculous they appeared. His business suit simply highlighted in 
fashion what Trump captured in words during the Republican debates and in the 
primaries: Marco, Jeb, Ted (and Mike and Rich and Chris) were chimerical. They 
were nothing more (the sowing of doubt was sufficient) than the puppets of pollsters 
and puffers. As for Trump, perhaps the suit and tie were a bit preposterous, but they 
evoked his willfulness; they were his brand. That long red tie proclaimed that he 
dressed himself. Alone among the contenders, Trump was authentic. 
Trump is hardly an innovator. His 2016 campaign resurrected an elemental 
populist impulse that has inhabited the recesses and byways of American political 
culture from at least the Age of Jackson. For American populists, Trump stands out, 
like Jackson before him, because he was an outsider and a disruptor. His very lack of 
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qualifications for office proved instrumental in winning him the presidency. He also 
had some help. Only a perfect storm could propel a disruptor like Trump into the 
White House.  Much of the credit must go to the Democratic Party for nominating the 
ultimate Washington insider and running a campaign based on little more than that 
she deserved the office. Hillary Rodham Clinton personified and her policies 
expressed all the aspects of elitist superiority that the populists decry. She was as 
much Trump’s ideal foil as John Quincy Adams was Andrew Jackson’s almost two 
centuries earlier. One can almost hear Clinton’s inaugural echoing Adams’ first 
annual message declaring how the Progressives should not be “palsied by the will of 
our constituents.” Highly educated and the insider par excellence, Hillary not only 
came across as superior and smarter than the voters, but actually seemed to 
embrace her smug superiority. Rather than highlight Trump’s deficiencies, the 
swagger and arrogance of a campaign that boasted theirs was the “best prepared 
candidate ever” convinced even moderate voters that her complacent arrogant 
elitism was just too much to stomach. This time, in the privacy of the voting booth, 
they sent that smirking know-it-all a powerful lesson in humility, secure in the 
conviction that their disruptive protest vote would have no bearing on the outcome. 
Trump could not possibly win. Hillary patronized and condescended her way to 
defeat and with it a new populist insurgency invaded the establishment. Cue again 
the tune played at Yorktown in 1781. 
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